Click on the Link below to go through the notification
http://www.servicetax.gov.in/notifications/notfns-2k11/st-odr03-29dec11.htm
http://www.servicetax.gov.in/notifications/notfns-2k11/st-odr03-29dec11.htm
Friday 30 December 2011
Sunday 18 December 2011
Service Tax proposed to undergo Plastic Surgery- Taxation based on Negative List
Service Tax is proposed to be levied on all services except those provided in Negative List.
Service is defined to “mean anything which does not constitute supply of goods, money or immovable property” A number of specific inclusions or exclusions were further elaborated.
The charging section somewhat as follows:
“There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as service tax) at the rate of ... per cent of the value of services provided or to be provided by a taxable person to another person and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.”
The above charging section is illustrative in terms of the present scheme of taxation and the same will naturally look quite different if the negative list is introduced alongwith the GST, capturing all the various activities that will be brought within the purview of the GST.
Taxable person may be defined as: “any person who independently carries out any economic activity, whether or not for a pecuniary profit”.
Thus the impact of all the proposed charging section will be to confine taxation to transactions in services carried out with another person by a person engaged in an economic activity on his own account
Check this link out for discussion paper on Revised Concept Paper on Taxation of Services based on Negative List:
http://www.cbec.gov.in/concpt-ppr-velst.pdf
Thursday 8 December 2011
Current A/c operated with Sister concerns for the purpose of business, such advances to be out of Deemed Dividend 2(22)(e) coverage - [CIT V/s Arvind Kumar Jain Delhi high Court-ITA 589 OF 2011]
This case is selected to be published on this blog for the following reasons:
In the given case:
[a] The High Court has applied one of the Rule of Interpretation of Statues "Noscitur a Sociis."
[b] The High Court laid principle for differentiating 'Loans & Advance' from 'Advances only'
[c] The High Court upheld the principle of substance over form reflected from assessee books.
Facts of the case
-Assessee holds 50% in a Pvt Ltd Co [A.A.Periodicals Pvt Ltd]
-Assessee and Pvt Ltd Co. were in same business [i.e Purchase & Sale of Books & Journals]
-Books of assessee reflected Unsecured Loan taken from Co.
-Assessing Officer treats the above Loan as Deemeed Dividend u/s 2(22)(e)
-Assessee takes the ground that the said amount reflected continuing Business relationship and running account was maintained showing those transaction
-Assessing Officer did not accept assessee's stand as in the books of accounts the said amount was shown as " Unsecured Loan"
Findings of CIT (A)
-A & A Periodicals were in the business of trading i.e. purchase and sale of books and journals.
-there were business transactions between the assessee and the A & A Periodicals
-a running account was being maintained reflecting the regular transactions between the two business entities
-the amount of Rs. 47,25,318.80 paise was the result of those business transactions
Conclusion of CIT (A)
-the amount was not given by A & A Periodicals to the assessee by way of loan
ITAT affirmed CIT (A) order
High Court judgement [Relevant extracts only]
4. It is not in dispute that Section 2 (22) (e) of the Act creates a fiction of making such loan and advance under circumstances, as deemed dividend, would be attracted only when some loan or advance is given by the company to another person who is having particular shareholding in the said company. However, in the present case, two authorities below have arrived at a finding of fact that the amount in question represented the credit balance as a result of transactions between A & A Periodicals and the assessee on account of business relations and payment was not in the nature of „loan or advance‟.
5. In CIT Vs. Raj Kumar (2009) 318 ITR 462, this Court has held that if the payments are made by such a company to even its shareholder having substantial interest but are the result of business transactions between the parties, then such payments cannot be treated as loan or advance and the money so received cannot be treated as deemed dividend within the meaning of Section 2 (22)(e) of the Act. The following discussion in the said judgment spells out the conditions which are to be fulfilled before the amount paid is treated as deemed dividend as well as the principle that trade advance does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Section 2 (22) (e) of the Act:-
“(i) The company making the payment is one in which public are not substantially interested.
(ii) money should be paid by the company to a shareholder holding not less than ten per cent (10%) of the voting power of the said company. It would make no difference if the payment was out of the assets of the company or otherwise.
(iii) The money should be paid either by way of an advance or loan or it may be “any payment” which the company may make on behalf of, or for the individual benefit of, any share holder or also to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which it is substantially interested.
(iv) And, lastly, the limiting factor being that these payments must be to the extent of accumulated profits, possessed by such a company.”
Therefore, if the said background is kept in mind, it is clear that Sub-clause (e) of Section 2(22) of the Act, which is pari-materia with Clause (e) of Section 2(6A) of the 1922 Act, plainly seeks to bring within the tax net accumulated profits which are distributed by closely held companies to its shareholders in the form of loans. The purpose being that persons who manage such closely held companies should not arrange their affairs in a manner that they assist the shareholders in avoiding the payment of taxes by having these companies pay or distribute, what would legitimately be dividend in the hands of the shareholders, money in the form of an advance or loan.
If this purpose is kept in mind then, in our view, the word "advance' has to be read in conjunction with the word "loan'. Usually attributes of a loan are that it involves positive act of lending coupled with acceptance by the other side of the money as loan: it generally carries an interest and there is an obligation of re-payment. On the other hand, in its widest meaning the term "advance' may or may not include lending. The word "advance' if not found in the company of or in conjunction with a word "loan' may or may not include the obligation of repayment. If it does then it would be a loan. Thus, arises the conundrum as to what meaning one would attribute to the term "advance'. The rule of construction to our minds which answers this conundrum is "noscitur a sociis."
The said rule has been explained both by the Privy Council in the case of Angus Robertson v. George Day (1879) 5 AC 63 by observing "it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them" and our Supreme Court in the case of Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills ltd v. CCE, AIR 1991 SC 754 and State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610.
Importantly, the broad principles which emerge from the judgment of the Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of the said rule of construction are briefly as follows:
(i) does the term in issue have more than one meaning attributed to it i.e., based on the setting or the context one could apply the narrower or wider meaning;
(ii) are words or terms used found in a group totally "dissimilar' or is there a "common thread' running through them;
(iii) the purpose behind insertion of the term.
Let's examine as to whether based on the aforesaid tests the said rule of construction "noscitur a sociis' ought to be applied in the instant case.
(i) the term "advance' has undoubtedly more than one meaning depending on the context in which it is used; (ii) both the terms, that is, advance or loan are related to the "accumulated profits' of the company; (iii) and last but not the least the purpose behind insertion of the term advance was to bring within the tax net payments made in guise of loan to shareholders by companies in which they have a substantial interest so as to avoid payment of tax by the shareholders;
Keeping the aforesaid rule in mind we are of the opinion that the word "advance' which appears in the company of the word "loan' could only mean such advance which carries with it an obligation of repayment. Trade advance which are in the nature of money transacted to give effect to a commercial transactions would not, in our view, fall within the ambit of the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. This interpretation would allow the rule of purposive construction with noscitur a sociis, as was done by the Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India v. Retd. LIC Officers Assn. [2008] 3 SCC 321.”]
6. Learned counsel for the appellant hammered the fact that the amount was shown by the assessee himself in his books of accounts as “unsecured loan” and, therefore, the order of the Assessing Officer was correct.
7. It is trite law that mere nomenclature of entry in the books of accounts is not determinative of the true nature of transaction. See Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. India Discount Co. Ltd. 75 ITR 191 (SC), Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Provincial Farmers (P) Ltd. 108 ITR 219 (Cal) and KCP Ltd. Vs. CIT, 245 ITR 421. In the present case after going through the relevant evidence as well as current account maintained between the parties, it has been established that the payment made were the result of trading transaction between the parties and the amount was not given by way of loan or advance.
8. We thus, find that no question of law arises in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
In the given case:
[a] The High Court has applied one of the Rule of Interpretation of Statues "Noscitur a Sociis."
[b] The High Court laid principle for differentiating 'Loans & Advance' from 'Advances only'
[c] The High Court upheld the principle of substance over form reflected from assessee books.
Facts of the case
-Assessee holds 50% in a Pvt Ltd Co [A.A.Periodicals Pvt Ltd]
-Assessee and Pvt Ltd Co. were in same business [i.e Purchase & Sale of Books & Journals]
-Books of assessee reflected Unsecured Loan taken from Co.
-Assessing Officer treats the above Loan as Deemeed Dividend u/s 2(22)(e)
-Assessee takes the ground that the said amount reflected continuing Business relationship and running account was maintained showing those transaction
-Assessing Officer did not accept assessee's stand as in the books of accounts the said amount was shown as " Unsecured Loan"
Findings of CIT (A)
-A & A Periodicals were in the business of trading i.e. purchase and sale of books and journals.
-there were business transactions between the assessee and the A & A Periodicals
-a running account was being maintained reflecting the regular transactions between the two business entities
-the amount of Rs. 47,25,318.80 paise was the result of those business transactions
Conclusion of CIT (A)
-the amount was not given by A & A Periodicals to the assessee by way of loan
ITAT affirmed CIT (A) order
High Court judgement [Relevant extracts only]
4. It is not in dispute that Section 2 (22) (e) of the Act creates a fiction of making such loan and advance under circumstances, as deemed dividend, would be attracted only when some loan or advance is given by the company to another person who is having particular shareholding in the said company. However, in the present case, two authorities below have arrived at a finding of fact that the amount in question represented the credit balance as a result of transactions between A & A Periodicals and the assessee on account of business relations and payment was not in the nature of „loan or advance‟.
5. In CIT Vs. Raj Kumar (2009) 318 ITR 462, this Court has held that if the payments are made by such a company to even its shareholder having substantial interest but are the result of business transactions between the parties, then such payments cannot be treated as loan or advance and the money so received cannot be treated as deemed dividend within the meaning of Section 2 (22)(e) of the Act. The following discussion in the said judgment spells out the conditions which are to be fulfilled before the amount paid is treated as deemed dividend as well as the principle that trade advance does not fall within the ambit of provisions of Section 2 (22) (e) of the Act:-
“(i) The company making the payment is one in which public are not substantially interested.
(ii) money should be paid by the company to a shareholder holding not less than ten per cent (10%) of the voting power of the said company. It would make no difference if the payment was out of the assets of the company or otherwise.
(iii) The money should be paid either by way of an advance or loan or it may be “any payment” which the company may make on behalf of, or for the individual benefit of, any share holder or also to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which it is substantially interested.
(iv) And, lastly, the limiting factor being that these payments must be to the extent of accumulated profits, possessed by such a company.”
Therefore, if the said background is kept in mind, it is clear that Sub-clause (e) of Section 2(22) of the Act, which is pari-materia with Clause (e) of Section 2(6A) of the 1922 Act, plainly seeks to bring within the tax net accumulated profits which are distributed by closely held companies to its shareholders in the form of loans. The purpose being that persons who manage such closely held companies should not arrange their affairs in a manner that they assist the shareholders in avoiding the payment of taxes by having these companies pay or distribute, what would legitimately be dividend in the hands of the shareholders, money in the form of an advance or loan.
If this purpose is kept in mind then, in our view, the word "advance' has to be read in conjunction with the word "loan'. Usually attributes of a loan are that it involves positive act of lending coupled with acceptance by the other side of the money as loan: it generally carries an interest and there is an obligation of re-payment. On the other hand, in its widest meaning the term "advance' may or may not include lending. The word "advance' if not found in the company of or in conjunction with a word "loan' may or may not include the obligation of repayment. If it does then it would be a loan. Thus, arises the conundrum as to what meaning one would attribute to the term "advance'. The rule of construction to our minds which answers this conundrum is "noscitur a sociis."
The said rule has been explained both by the Privy Council in the case of Angus Robertson v. George Day (1879) 5 AC 63 by observing "it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them" and our Supreme Court in the case of Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills ltd v. CCE, AIR 1991 SC 754 and State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610.
Importantly, the broad principles which emerge from the judgment of the Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of the said rule of construction are briefly as follows:
(i) does the term in issue have more than one meaning attributed to it i.e., based on the setting or the context one could apply the narrower or wider meaning;
(ii) are words or terms used found in a group totally "dissimilar' or is there a "common thread' running through them;
(iii) the purpose behind insertion of the term.
Let's examine as to whether based on the aforesaid tests the said rule of construction "noscitur a sociis' ought to be applied in the instant case.
(i) the term "advance' has undoubtedly more than one meaning depending on the context in which it is used; (ii) both the terms, that is, advance or loan are related to the "accumulated profits' of the company; (iii) and last but not the least the purpose behind insertion of the term advance was to bring within the tax net payments made in guise of loan to shareholders by companies in which they have a substantial interest so as to avoid payment of tax by the shareholders;
Keeping the aforesaid rule in mind we are of the opinion that the word "advance' which appears in the company of the word "loan' could only mean such advance which carries with it an obligation of repayment. Trade advance which are in the nature of money transacted to give effect to a commercial transactions would not, in our view, fall within the ambit of the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act. This interpretation would allow the rule of purposive construction with noscitur a sociis, as was done by the Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India v. Retd. LIC Officers Assn. [2008] 3 SCC 321.”]
6. Learned counsel for the appellant hammered the fact that the amount was shown by the assessee himself in his books of accounts as “unsecured loan” and, therefore, the order of the Assessing Officer was correct.
7. It is trite law that mere nomenclature of entry in the books of accounts is not determinative of the true nature of transaction. See Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. India Discount Co. Ltd. 75 ITR 191 (SC), Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Provincial Farmers (P) Ltd. 108 ITR 219 (Cal) and KCP Ltd. Vs. CIT, 245 ITR 421. In the present case after going through the relevant evidence as well as current account maintained between the parties, it has been established that the payment made were the result of trading transaction between the parties and the amount was not given by way of loan or advance.
8. We thus, find that no question of law arises in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
Saturday 26 November 2011
Shares held as Capital Asset converted into Stock In Trade, no Exemption u/s 10(38) for STT paid for sale of share in market [Alka Agarwal V/s ADIT, Delhi ITAT]
Facts of the Case:
-Assessee is Non resident individual
-Converted Shares held as personal Investment in Stock In Trade w.e.f 01.04.05
-Entire Shares sold in F.Y.05-06 after holding shares for total peiod of more than ONE Year
- Sale of Shares were made into market and therefore suffered STT
-Assessee claimed the gain as exempted u/s 10(38)
-AO disallowed such exemption
-CIT (A) upheld the order of AO
Tribunal Decision:
Relevant extracts of the said descision is as under
16. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid provisions, in our mind, makes it clear that as far as the benefit of Section 10(38) is concerned, the assessee shall not be eligible for this benefit at the first stage of chargeability of capital gains because the deemed sale is the point of conversion into stock-in-trade which had not suffered STT. Further, with regards to the second part of the transaction, the assessee is not eligible for benefit under Section 10(38) because the second part of the transaction is purely a business transaction and provisions of Section 10(38) are applicable only in terms of long term capital assets. In our view, these provisions should be read in this manner and there can be no confusion or two opinions about the scheme of the provisions of conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade as also the liability towards the capital gains tax on sale of shares held as capital asset which has suffered STT. Nowhere on the date of actual sale, the assessee was holding the impugned securities as a part of capital asset. They have already become the stock-in-trade of the business. So, we do not agree with the assessee as regards the total exemption from capital gains tax in respect of the capital assets which were converted into stock-in-trade as on 1st April, 2005 merely because on the date of sale such stock-in-trade the assessee was required to pay STT on them. We agree with the departmental stand in respect of this issue as we do not find any merit in such contentions of the assessee.
-Assessee is Non resident individual
-Converted Shares held as personal Investment in Stock In Trade w.e.f 01.04.05
-Entire Shares sold in F.Y.05-06 after holding shares for total peiod of more than ONE Year
- Sale of Shares were made into market and therefore suffered STT
-Assessee claimed the gain as exempted u/s 10(38)
-AO disallowed such exemption
-CIT (A) upheld the order of AO
Tribunal Decision:
Relevant extracts of the said descision is as under
16. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid provisions, in our mind, makes it clear that as far as the benefit of Section 10(38) is concerned, the assessee shall not be eligible for this benefit at the first stage of chargeability of capital gains because the deemed sale is the point of conversion into stock-in-trade which had not suffered STT. Further, with regards to the second part of the transaction, the assessee is not eligible for benefit under Section 10(38) because the second part of the transaction is purely a business transaction and provisions of Section 10(38) are applicable only in terms of long term capital assets. In our view, these provisions should be read in this manner and there can be no confusion or two opinions about the scheme of the provisions of conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade as also the liability towards the capital gains tax on sale of shares held as capital asset which has suffered STT. Nowhere on the date of actual sale, the assessee was holding the impugned securities as a part of capital asset. They have already become the stock-in-trade of the business. So, we do not agree with the assessee as regards the total exemption from capital gains tax in respect of the capital assets which were converted into stock-in-trade as on 1st April, 2005 merely because on the date of sale such stock-in-trade the assessee was required to pay STT on them. We agree with the departmental stand in respect of this issue as we do not find any merit in such contentions of the assessee.
Tuesday 22 November 2011
Indexation to be allowed from the date of ALLOTMENT irrespective of date of PAYMENT for the property acquired: Praveen Gupta V/s ACIT [TTJ 307] ITAT New Delhi
Facts of the case:
Assessee booked flat in 1995-96
Full payment for the flat booked was made in F.Y.2001-02
Sold Flat in F.Y.2006-07 for Rs.90 Lacs
Assessee computed Indexation from 1995-96
AO denied indexation from 1995-96 instead allowed Indexation from 2001-02
CIT (A) upheld the order of AO
Judgement :
Relevant extracts of the judgement-
26. Now, coming to the second question, which relates to the date from which the indexed cost of acquisition is to be computed. Here, it has been the case of the assessee that on the date of allotment of flat, the property was identified. The assessee got the right over the said property and from that date the indexation benefit has to be given to the assessee. Explanation (iii) to s. 48 reads as under which makes entitle the assessee to the indexation benefit:-
“(iii) ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ means an amount which bears to the cost of acquisition the same proportion as cost inflation index for the year in which the asset is transferred bears to the cost inflation index for the first year in which the asset was held by the assessee or for the year beginning on the 1st day of April, 1981, whichever is later.”
“(iii) ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ means an amount which bears to the cost of acquisition the same proportion as cost inflation index for the year in which the asset is transferred bears to the cost inflation index for the first year in which the asset was held by the assessee or for the year beginning on the 1st day of April, 1981, whichever is later.”
29. According to the aforementioned definition, capital asset means property of any kind held by an assessee whether or not connected with the business or profession and it excludes certain items which while considering the facts of the present case are not relevant. Therefore, it has to be seen that whether by entering into an agreement vide which the assessee was allotted a particular flat by allotment letter whether the assessee has held any asset or not. By entering into an agreement to allot a flat, the assessee has identified a particular property which he intended to buy from the builder and the builder is also bound to provide the applicant with that property by accepting certain advance amount and making agreement for balance payment as scheduled in the agreement. Thus, going into the provisions, it is not necessary that to constitute a capital asset the assessee must be the owner by way of a conveyance deed in respect of that asset for the purpose of computing capital gain. The assessee had acquired a right to get a particular flat from the builder and that right of the assessee itself is a capital asset. The word ‘held’ used in s. 2(14) as well as Explanation to s. 48 clearly depicts that assessee must have some right in the capital asset which is subject to transfer. By making the payment to the builder and having received allotment letter in lieu thereof, the assessee will be holding capital asset and, therefore, the benefit of indexation has to be granted to the assessee on the basis of payments made by him for acquiring the said asset and the assessee has rightly claimed the indexation benefit from the dates when he has made the payments to the builder. Therefore, we see force in the claim of the assessee. The AO is directed to provide the benefit of indexation to the assessee in the manner in which the assessee has claimed.
Monday 24 October 2011
Form 49AA replaces PAN Application form, Form 49A for Non Indian Citizen and entities formed outside India w.e.f 1/11/2011
Click on the link to view revised Form 49A and Form 49AA
(You will be taken to Income tax website)
Revised Form 49A
[applicable for Indian Citizens, Entities incorporated or formed in India]
http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DITTaxmann/IncomeTaxRules/pdf/itr62Form49A.pdf
New Form 49AA
[applicable to Non Indian Citizens and Entities incorporated outside India]
http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DITTaxmann/IncomeTaxRules/pdf/itr62form49aa.pdf
(You will be taken to Income tax website)
Revised Form 49A
[applicable for Indian Citizens, Entities incorporated or formed in India]
http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DITTaxmann/IncomeTaxRules/pdf/itr62Form49A.pdf
New Form 49AA
[applicable to Non Indian Citizens and Entities incorporated outside India]
http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DITTaxmann/IncomeTaxRules/pdf/itr62form49aa.pdf
Saturday 22 October 2011
Latest CBDT Circular: Applicability of TDS provisions on Interest accruing from Deposits made with Bank under the direction of Court in the course of Litigation
CBDT has issued Circular no.08/2011 dated 14/10/2011 clarifying position of TDS applicability in case where interest in accrued/becomes payable on Deposits made under the direction of Court under any Litigation.
Click on the following link to view Circular:
(You will be taken to National Website of Income Tax)
http://incometaxindia.gov.in/archive/BreakingNews_Tax_Delhi_10172011.pdf
Click on the following link to view Circular:
(You will be taken to National Website of Income Tax)
http://incometaxindia.gov.in/archive/BreakingNews_Tax_Delhi_10172011.pdf
TAX ACCOUNTING STANDARD (TAS) : Whats that?
CBDT PUBLISHES DISCUSSION PAPER ON TAX ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has made public the
discussion paper on accounting standards, to be known as Tax Accounting
Standards (TAS), for feedback from all concerned.
The proposed TAS, while enabling smooth transition to International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), will provide certainty on accounting
issues for tax purposes as it removes alternatives and will cover all tax
accounting issues.
The TAS, applicable only to computation of taxable income under the
Income Tax Act 1961, will be different from accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs under the Companies Act 1956. However, separate books of account are not required to be maintained under TAS, thus reducing compliance burden on businesses.
A Committee of experts from the government and professionals was
constituted by the CBDT in December 2010 to suggest accounting standards for
tax purposes that could be notified under section 145 of the Income Tax Act
1961. The Committee submitted its interim report in August 2011, suggesting
the above measures. At present, section 145 provides that the method of
accounting for computation of income under the head “Profits and gains of
business or profession” and “Income from other sources” can either be the cash
or mercantile system of accounting. The Finance Act, 1995 empowered the
Central Government to notify Accounting Standards for any class of taxpayer
or for any class of income.
Click the link below to view the discussion paper:
(You will be taken to National Website of Income Tax)
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/archive/DiscussionPaper_10172011.pdf
The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has made public the
discussion paper on accounting standards, to be known as Tax Accounting
Standards (TAS), for feedback from all concerned.
The proposed TAS, while enabling smooth transition to International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), will provide certainty on accounting
issues for tax purposes as it removes alternatives and will cover all tax
accounting issues.
The TAS, applicable only to computation of taxable income under the
Income Tax Act 1961, will be different from accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs under the Companies Act 1956. However, separate books of account are not required to be maintained under TAS, thus reducing compliance burden on businesses.
A Committee of experts from the government and professionals was
constituted by the CBDT in December 2010 to suggest accounting standards for
tax purposes that could be notified under section 145 of the Income Tax Act
1961. The Committee submitted its interim report in August 2011, suggesting
the above measures. At present, section 145 provides that the method of
accounting for computation of income under the head “Profits and gains of
business or profession” and “Income from other sources” can either be the cash
or mercantile system of accounting. The Finance Act, 1995 empowered the
Central Government to notify Accounting Standards for any class of taxpayer
or for any class of income.
Click the link below to view the discussion paper:
(You will be taken to National Website of Income Tax)
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/archive/DiscussionPaper_10172011.pdf
Thursday 20 October 2011
Wednesday 19 October 2011
Sale of Depreciable asset though charged as Short Term Capital Gain but the same can be set off against any other Long Term Capital Loss- [Komac Investment & Finance (P) Ltd V/s ITO- ITAT, Mumbai]
Brief Background
-Assessee sold office premise on which depreciation was claimed every year
-Gain Rs.53,16,397/- arising therefrom charged as Short Term Capital Gain by virtue of Provisions of
S.50(2)
-Office premise was held for more than 36 months
- Other items in the return being
[a] Business Loss Rs.11,46,422
[b] Unabsorbed Depreciation Rs.25,39,085/-
[c] Brought forward Long Term Capital Loss of Rs.47,13,107
-Assessee claimed set off of all of the above against Short term Capital Gain of Rs.53,16,397/-
-Assessing Officer disallowed the claim of set off of Long Term Capital Loss against STCG above, applying provisions of S.74(1)(b)
-Assessee filed First appeal to CIT (A)
-CIT (A) confirmed the action of Assessing officer thereby disallowing the claim of set-off
-Assessee filed 2nd Appeal to ITAT (Mumbai)
Provision of Section 74(1)(b)
74(1) Where in respect of any assessment year, the net result of the computation under the head of "Capital Gain" is a loss to the assessee, the whole loss shall, subject to other provisions of this chapter, be carried forward to the following year, and-
(a) ....................
(b) insofar as such loss relates to a long term capital asset, it shall be set off against, income, if any, under the head "Capital Gain" assessable for that assessment year in respect of ANY OTHER CAPITAL ASSET NOT BEING SHORT TERM CAPITAL ASSET.''
Case law referred: ACE Builders (P) Ltd of Jurisdictional Bombay High Court
Held by ITAT as under:
11. We find the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of ACE Builders (P.) Ltd. (supra) at pages 219 and 220 has held as under :
"It is true that section 50 is enacted with the object of denying multiple benefits to the owners of depreciable assets. However, that restriction is limited to the computation of capital gains and not to the exemption provisions. In other words, where the long-term capital asset has availed of depreciation, then the capital gain has to be computed in the manner prescribed under section 50 and the capital gains tax will be charged as if such capital gain has arisen out of a short-term capital asset but if such capital gain is invested in the manner prescribed in section 54E, then the capital gain shall not be charged under section 45 of the Income-tax Act. To put it simply, the benefit of section 54E will be available to the assessee irrespective of the fact that the computation of capital gains is done either under sections 48 and 49 or under section 50. The contention of the Revenue that by amendment to section 50 the long-term capital asset has been converted into a short-term capital asset is also without any merit. As stated hereinabove, the legal fiction created by the statute is to deem the capital gain as short-term capital gain and not to deem the asset as short-term capital asset. Therefore, it cannot be said that section 50 converts a long-term capital asset into a short-term capital asset."
12. From the above it is clear that although the gain is short term capital gain due to the fiction created by provisions of section 50(2), the asset remained as "long term capital asset". Therefore, in view of the ratio laid down by the Jurisdictional High Court, the brought forward long term capital loss can be set off against the capital gain on account of transfer of the depreciable asset which has been held by the assessee for more than 36 months thereby making the asset a long term capital asset . In this view of the matter, we hold that under section 74(1)(b) the assessee is entitled to the claim of set off of long term capital loss against the income arising from the sale of office premises, the gain of which is short term due to the deeming provision but the asset is long term. The ground raised by the assessee is accordingly allowed.
13. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in favor of Assessee.
Tuesday 18 October 2011
S.50C has no implication on Calculation of depreciation- Mumbai High Court in CIT V/s Cable Corporation of India Ltd [2011, 336 ITR 56]
Brief facts of the case:
Flat sold for Rs.9,00,000
Stamp duty value Rs.66,44,902
Ld. AO reduced stamp value from block of asset to compute depreciation on WDV of the block
CIT (A) allowed the appeal in favor of assessee
High court held as follows:
When an asset is sold, section 43(6)(c)(i)(B) of the Act provides that the written down value of the block of assets shall be reduced by “moneys payable” in respect of the asset that is sold. The expression “moneys payable” as per Explanation 4 to section 43(6) shall have the meaning as in the Explanation below sub-section (4) of section 41.
7. As per Explanation below section 41(4) the expression “moneys payable” in relation to the sale of a building, machinery, plant or furniture would be the price for which it is sold and not the fair market value of the asset. Therefore, on a plain reading of the above provisions, it is clear that the written down value of all the assets falling within that block of assets at the beginning of the previous year has to be adjusted by the amount at which the asset is actually sold and not by the fair market value of the asset that is sold.
8. As rightly observed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Legislature in section 43(6)(c)(i)(B) has used a different connotation in respect of sale of assets and sale of scrap. As per that section on sale of an asset, the written down value of the block of assets is to be reduced by the amount at which the asset is actually sold, whereas, in the case of sale of scrap, the value of the scrap, meaning thereby, the fair market value of the scrap and not the price at which the scrap is sold should be reduced from the written down value of the block of assets.
9. In our opinion, the interpretation adopted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is in accordance with law and no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal. In the result, the question of law raised in this appeal is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Flat sold for Rs.9,00,000
Stamp duty value Rs.66,44,902
Ld. AO reduced stamp value from block of asset to compute depreciation on WDV of the block
CIT (A) allowed the appeal in favor of assessee
High court held as follows:
When an asset is sold, section 43(6)(c)(i)(B) of the Act provides that the written down value of the block of assets shall be reduced by “moneys payable” in respect of the asset that is sold. The expression “moneys payable” as per Explanation 4 to section 43(6) shall have the meaning as in the Explanation below sub-section (4) of section 41.
7. As per Explanation below section 41(4) the expression “moneys payable” in relation to the sale of a building, machinery, plant or furniture would be the price for which it is sold and not the fair market value of the asset. Therefore, on a plain reading of the above provisions, it is clear that the written down value of all the assets falling within that block of assets at the beginning of the previous year has to be adjusted by the amount at which the asset is actually sold and not by the fair market value of the asset that is sold.
8. As rightly observed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Legislature in section 43(6)(c)(i)(B) has used a different connotation in respect of sale of assets and sale of scrap. As per that section on sale of an asset, the written down value of the block of assets is to be reduced by the amount at which the asset is actually sold, whereas, in the case of sale of scrap, the value of the scrap, meaning thereby, the fair market value of the scrap and not the price at which the scrap is sold should be reduced from the written down value of the block of assets.
9. In our opinion, the interpretation adopted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is in accordance with law and no fault can be found with the decision of the Tribunal. In the result, the question of law raised in this appeal is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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